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ORGANIZATION, BUDGETING AND FUNDING OF THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA'S LOCAL COURTS*
Peter R. Kolker**
The mechanism for funding the District of Columbia's local court system reflects the unique and complex character of the District. The means and method of
budgeting for and funding this vital function has evolved over the years, reflecting the maturation of the District from its pre-Home Rule days to the present.
This evolution is a reflection of the District's growing pains and financial crises,
as well as the unusual symbiosis and tension between the District and the federal
government. The budget system is also the product of the limitations imposed on
the District's restricted taxing authority, which results in a dependency on the
federal government for functions ordinarily performed by local governments.
The current budget system ensures a high, but not complete, degree of independence for the District's judiciary and provides for a relatively stable funding
source. However, the system also limits the options that the District's legislative
and executive branches have to allocate resources among programs by taking the
courts' budget out of the equation. As the process has evolved, the local judiciary
has become the financial protectorate of the federal rather than District government, since the courts apply directly to Congress for funds and are subject only to
its budget decisions. The annual bill for the courts' operations and capital budget
approaches $350 million, all currently sought from and paid by the federal government. In addition, there are substantial expenditures required to support
other justice-related agencies, such as the Pretrial Services Agency, the Public
Defender Service and the U.S. Attorney's Office. Furthermore, the District's
Home Rule charter precludes the imposition of a commuter tax and real estate
taxes cannot be imposed on the substantial federal and embassy property located
in the District. Accordingly, a change in either the budgeting process or the organization of the courts and related agencies could not be realistically considered
independent of a proposal to replace the substantial income contribution now
made by the federal government as a direct expenditure. The starting point for an
analysis of the current budget process is an understanding of how the D.C. court
system evolved and was funded from the pre-home rule days to the present.

* This essay was compiled by Peter R. Kolker after the Symposium on District of Columbia
Democracy and the Third Branch of Government. Readers of this essay should note that the views,
opinions, and some factual assertions expressed are formulated from Mr. Kolker's wealth of experience in the D.C. court system.
** Peter R. Kolker, Council for Court Excellence.
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I.
A.

HISTORY

The Court Reorganization Act of 1970

Both court reorganization and home rule came to the District in the early
1970's. Prior to this time, the District's "special relationship" with the federal
government relegated to the local court system1 jurisdiction of only minor criminal matters and a limited range of civil disputes. This is not unlike the jurisdiction
found in the lowest level of state courts. 2 Remarkably, all felonies, including common law crimes such as murder, robbery, rape, burglary and the like, were prosecuted in the U.S. District Court along with federal offenses. That court also had
jurisdiction over such classically local matters as probate administration and divorce, as well as more important civil disputes, including cases which would not
qualify for jurisdiction in federal courts outside the District. Appellate review of
these trial court decisions reposed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of
3
Columbia Circuit.
By contrast, by the late 1960s, the D.C. Court of General Sessions was the
venue for prosecution of misdemeanors, juvenile offenses, landlord-tenant disputes, and small claims matters. Appellate review of these decisions was vested
first in the D.C. Court of Appeals. However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit had discretionary review over the D.C. Court of Appeals decisions,
so that even in local matters, decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals
predominated over those of the D.C. Court of Appeals. Bar admissions and disciplinary proceedings were also controlled by the federal rather than the local
courts. The fiscal burdens of these two systems generally followed the subject
matter jurisdiction, with a significant portion of the federal court expenses paid
out of the District's budget.
The administration of justice under this arrangement was unsatisfactory on a
number of levels. First, by the late 1960s the court system was staggering under
the weight of the caseload and was also encountering administrative problems. A
court management study commissioned by the Senate's Committee on the District of Columbia, as it was then designated, noted that the length of time to
dispose of serious criminal cases was increasing in both the federal and local
courts, and civil case dispositions were also becoming more prolonged. 4
1 The local court system was known at this time as the D.C. Court of Appeals and the D.C.
Court of General Sessions.
2 The jurisdiction of the district courts in Maryland, which is limited to minor criminal matters,
landlord-tenant disputes and civil disputes subject to a modest dollar limit. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN.,
CrS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 4-101-4-405 (2007).
3 The Circuit Court sometimes referred to as second in importance only to the U.S. Supreme
Court because of its review of many federal administrative agency and legislative decisions.
4 This report was compiled by the Ellison Commission in 1970.
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Not surprisingly, this arrangement was unsatisfactory to everyone, including
the District's citizens, who possessed only limited influence over their own courts
because they had no institutional input into the selection of judges or the administration of justice. At the same time, many federal judges chafed at having to
resolve local disputes, which their colleagues in other districts would never have
touched. The local judiciary also objected to being side-lined by the limits to and
review of the local courts' jurisdiction by the federal appeals court. Finally, Congress was also displeased with this arrangement. The increasing backlog in the
disposition of criminal cases was thought to undermine the deterrent effect of
criminal law. Furthermore, the U.S. Court of Appeals bench of the late 1960s was
of a particularly liberal character, which resulted in decisions that, while pathbreaking, went contrary to the more conservative bent of Congress. 5 Finally,
there was an ever increasing backlog of criminal cases which the federal court
seemed unable to resolve in a timely manner.
These concerns set the stage for the passage of the 1970 D.C. Court Reform
and Criminal Procedure Act,6 which established the D.C. court system as we
know it today: A typically pyramidal structure with the D.C. Court of Appeals at
the apex functioning as the highest court reviewing matters of a local nature.
These decisions were, and are, subject to review only by the U.S. Supreme Court
in the same manner as the decisions of the highest court of a state are subject to
review. Similarly, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia received greatly
expanded jurisdiction over those actions typically comprising the bread-and-butter of a state trial court system: common law felonies, misdemeanors, juvenile
proceedings, and civil cases falling outside the subject matter jurisdiction of a
federal court elsewhere in the nation. The transition from the pre-1970 system to
the current system was gradual and completed by 1973.
The 1970 court reorganization established an unusual method of governance
for the courts by creating a Joint Committee on Judicial Administration (the
"Joint Committee"), 7 comprised of the chief judges of the D.C. Court of Appeals
and the Superior Court, respectively, plus one associate judge from the Court of
Appeals and two from the Superior Court. Thus, the system was weighted in
favor of the trial court. The judiciary's independence from the executive and legislative branches of the District's government, as constituted both before and after home rule, was a hallmark of this arrangement. From then until now, it has
5 Examples of such revolutionary decisions, which had their origins in peculiarly local cases,
included decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in both criminal and civil law
areas. Because the opinions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit were regarded as coequal with those of the other circuit courts, these decisions resolving local disputes had an impact well
beyond the borders of the District of Columbia.
6 District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, Pub L. 91-358, 84
Stat. 476.
7 See D.C. CODE § 11-1701 (2001).

UNIVERSITY OF THE DisTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

been the responsibility of the Joint Committee to obtain the budget proposals
from each of the component courts, the Court of Appeals, the Superior Court
and the "Court System," 8 and to integrate them into a single budget for the
courts. The individual budgets are submitted to the Joint Committee which may
adjust a component budget only if agreed by four-fifths of the Joint Committee.
Once developed, the Joint Committee's aggregate budget is submitted to the decision maker for consideration and approval. Even though the reviewer of the
budget has changed, adjustment of the budget by the District's executive or legislative branches has never been permitted. By empowering the Joint Committee
to develop the courts' budget, the District's executive and legislative control over
this branch of government was deliberately restrained. Concomitantly, the independence of the budgetary independence of the court system has been
maximized.
This major realignment of jurisdiction resulted in a vast expansion of the local
court system, such that the local trial bench 9 increased from about twelve judges
prior to court reorganization to nearly forty by the end of the transition in 1973.
By 2006, the specified complement of trial judges had increased to fifty-nine, 10
including the Chief Judge, the associates judges as well as the judges of the Family Court. The D.C. Court of Appeals consists of a chief judge and eight associate
judges. All of the District's judges are currently appointed by the President to
fifteen-year terms. Presidential appointment is more of an historical artifact than
a constitutional requirement, however: the constitutional grant of authority to
establish and oversee the District, set out in Article I § 17 of the Constitution,
does not require Presidential (or even federal) appointment of local judges,
though it has been the tradition for at least the past half-century that the President has done so. Thus, the District's local judges are properly thought of and
referred to as presidentially appointed "Article I judges,"1 1 a feature some think
enhances the prestige of the local bench.
In addition to this full-time judiciary, there are a varying number of senior
judges who work part-time and who are compensated on a per diem basis. 12
There are also twenty-five magistrate judges with limited jurisdiction in the District's system, who assist with pre-trial proceedings in the criminal, civil, and Family Court components of the Superior Court. They are neither presidential
appointees nor are they provided a fifteen-year appointment, as are the Superior
Court and D.C. Court of Appeals judges.
8 The "court system" includes the administrative elements of the court including court reporters, interpreters, and clerical personnel.
9 The local trial bench was formerly known as the Court of General Sessions.
10 D.C. CODE § 11-903 (2001).
11 D.C. CODE § 11-1501 (2001); see also D.C. CODE § 11-703 (2001).
12 Pier diem, or the maximum that could be earned by a full-time judge.
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Since 1970, compensation of D.C. Court of Appeals judges is at the same level
as the compensation of judges of the federal circuit courts of appeal, 13 just as the
compensation of Superior Court judges is the same as that of the judges of the
federal district courts. 14 This salary relationship is vital to the recruitment and
retention of the local judiciary who are, with this linkage, assured of some modicum of steady compensation and of automatic salary increases whenever federal
judicial salaries are raised.
One modification to the judicial structure occurred in 2002, when Congress
again flexed its unique jurisdictional muscles over the District's local affairs by
creating the Family Court. 15 The Family Court is akin to a subsidiary of the Superior Court, with judges appointed in the same manner as Superior Court judges.
The Family Court's budget is a part of the Superior Court budget, and it is housed
in the same courthouse. Its judges are assigned only to family law matters, such as
juvenile delinquency, divorce, neglect, and guardianship cases. Congress's intervention in the District's judicial affairs serves as a reminder that the final word on
jurisdictional realignments remains on Capitol Hill. Indeed, the D.C. Code precludes the District from modifying its court organization or jurisdiction, reserving
those functions to Congress.1 6 As the Family Court legislation attests, Congress
can and will intervene in a purely local matter such as this when it is of a mind to
do so.
Court reorganization also assured that support personnel in the local court
system17 increased in tandem with increases in the judiciary. The local courts now
employ some 1,200 persons.' 8 Personnel used by the court to keep order remain
part of the U.S. Marshals under the U.S. Department of Justice and are not included within that number. The District-related cost of the Marshals' service is
also not reflected in the courts' budget.
The advent of a modern, local court system required a new court building to
house the D.C. Court of Appeals, the Superior Court, and the myriad functions
transferred by this jurisdictional change. Concomitantly, the financial burden of
the local court system grew apace, including not only the salaries, benefits,1 9 and
administrative expenses which had previously been a part of the federal court
budget, but also the expenses of the Criminal Justice Act 20 the D.C. Public Defender Service, the Pretrial Services Agency, and the probation office. At the
13 D.C. CODE § 11-703(b) (2001).
14 D.C. CODE § 11-904(b) (2001).
15 District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-114 115 Stat. 2101.
16 D.C. CODE § 1-206.02 (2001).
17 Such as judicial staffs, probation officers, pretrial release personnel, clerical, and administrative personnel.
18 D.C. CTS. ANN. REP. at 9 (2005).
19 Benefits include unfurlded pension obligations.
20 The Criminal Justice Act compensated private attorneys for defending indigent criminal defendants. D.C. CODE § 11-2601 (2005).
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same time, the capital costs of the new physical plant and its operations also increased dramatically compared to the pre-1970 period. By the time the transition
to the local court system had been completed, the entire burden of the judicial
system for adjustment of local disputes had shifted to the District, and the financial obligation likewise shifted to its budget. At the same time, the District's share
of expenses relating to the operations of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia diminished reciprocally.
B.

The 1973 Home Rule Act and the Courts' Budget

The shift of jurisdiction represented a major increase to the empowerment of
local citizens over the dispute resolution matters important to them, but full selfdetermination for the District was, and still is, a long way off. The next important
event with a significant impact on the court budgeting process was the enactment
in 1973 of the District of Columbia Home Rule Act. 2 1 The shift to a governmental structure accorded more responsibility to the citizens and their representatives
on the D.C. Council provided the occasion for unifying the budgeting process to
team up the courts' budget with the budget for other District agencies and operations. However, whereas the state model of a pyramidal judiciary 22 was replicated
in the jurisdictional aspect of D.C. court reorganization, the anomalies of the
District's situation did not lend itself to a budgeting process in the District to
parallel that used in the fifty states. Unlike the states, which are responsible for
financing all of their routine executive, legislative, and judicial functions from tax
revenue, the special circumstances affecting the District currently prevents the
District from achieving economic self-sufficiency. These special circumstances include the statutory prohibition on commuter taxation, the non-taxability of land
occupied by the federal government, foreign embassies, or the myriad non-profit
organizations drawn to the seat of national government. Thus, the budgeting process cannot replicate that of a self-sufficient state. Unless and until the District's
ability to generate revenue in ways that are not currently available to it should
change, the District must look to the federal government for financial support,
with its often unwanted twin: federal control. With this revenue structure in mind,
the budgeting and funding process was bound to take a different tack.
H.

THE BUDGETING PROCESS FROM

A.

1970

TO THE PRESENT

From 1970 to 1995

Starting with the 1970 Court Reorganization Act, the mechanism for budgeting and funding of the courts has not been completely independent of the execu21 District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act of 1973, Pub.
L. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774.
22 With a high court reviewable only by the Supreme Court.
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tive and legislative budgeting process. Thus, beginning in 1970, a structure was
put in place to maximize the independence of the judiciary. The budget for the
courts was required to be developed by the Joint Committee rather than the
Mayor. When Congress enacted the District's Home Rule Act in 1973, one of its
objectives was to restrict the capacity of both the D.C. Council and the Mayor to
affect the budget prepared and submitted by the Joint Committee.23 To accomplish this goal, Section 445 of the Home Rule Act specified that the Joint Committee must prepare and submit to the Mayor an annual and multi-year budget,
including both an operational and a capital improvement component. The Mayor
was charged with forwarding this budget without alteration to the D.C. Council,
though the Mayor was permitted to comment on its provisions. Similarly, Section 445 of the Home Rule Act required the D.C. Council to submit its budget to
the President, through the Office of Management and Budget ("OMB"). Section 445 provides that the Council "shall have no authority under this Act to
revise the Joint Committee's budget."' 24 Thus, under the Home Rule Act, Congress alone had the power to increase, decrease, or internally modify the courts'
budget by shifting funds among the courts. In this respect, the budgeting process
for the courts differs markedly from that in effect in the fifty states which, in
many cases, have the capacity to adjust the budget of any branch of government.
Instead, the budgeting process more closely resembles that applicable to the U.S.
Courts: A separate budget is2 5prepared by the Administrative Office of the Courts
and submitted to Congress.
It is worth noting that while neither the Council nor the Mayor may modify
the budget submitted by the Joint Committee because of the restrictions outlined
above, both bodies have frequently submitted comments to Congress suggesting
that the courts' budget is excessive. One study, undertaken in 1983, demonstrated
that in each year from 1972 to 1980, the recommendations conveyed by the
Mayor to Congress provided a lower budget amount than that requested by the
Joint Committee. 2 6 Resources have not enabled a study of more recent trends,
but it is to be expected that the Mayor or the Council might attempt to increase
the budget funds made available by Congress to special programs by encouraging
a reduction in the courts' budget. How this natural instinct would be manifest if
the Council or the Mayor had the authority to modify the courts' budget, now
currently denied them, is a matter for speculation.
23 This is not the only instance in which Congress restricted by statute the power of the D.C.
Council with respect to the administration of justice; the Council may not legislate in respect to criminal law matters, nor may it amend the jurisdiction granted to the D.C. Courts. D.C. CODE § 1-206.02
(2001).
24 District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub. L. 93198, 87 Stat. 774 at § 445.

25
26

Budget Contents and Submission to Congress, 31 U.S.C. § 1105(b) (2007).
S.REP. No. 98-34, at 101 (1983).
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Upon receipt of the District's budget, Congress considered the court budget at
the same time as it considered other budget requests by the District. Congress
had the authority to accept or modify the courts' budget. Before home rule and
continuing up to 1997, funding of the District's budget included a payment by
Congress known as the "federal payment." This sum, which varied annually, was
to be used by the District along with revenues raised by its own taxing program to
fund the functions of government. Although Congress fixed a budget amount for
the courts, it did not directly fund that amount. Instead, before 1997, Congress
provided the courts with a portion of the federal payment, calculated as a percentage of the District's approved budget, to the courts. For example, during the
fiscal year 1997, the federal payment represented 14% of the approved budget.2 7
While the courts received that amount from the federal payment, the balance of
the courts' budget was dependent upon tax revenues raised and administered by
the District. Thus, approval of the courts' budget by Congress was the first, but by
no means the last, step in the process of funding the court system, 8 and if the
District failed to generate sufficient revenues to fund the balance, the Courts
would, and did, come up short of the budget approved for it.
B.

The Financial Control Board of 1995

In the mid 1990s, the District's financial picture took a turn for the worse, and
the District appeared headed for possible bankruptcy. To avert such a catastrophic event and to limit the extent of support that the federal government
would be called upon to provide, Congress enacted the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995,29 creating what
was commonly referred to as the "Financial Control Board." With the advent of
the Financial Control Board, all portions of the District's budget, including that
relating to the courts, was reviewed and approved by the Financial Control
Board. The Joint Committee took the position that the Financial Control Board
was precluded from modifying the budget prepared by the Joint Committee, but
it was unclear whether that limitation actually applied to the Financial Control
Board. In any event, the courts' budget continued to be separately formulated,
presented, and administered.
C.

The 1997 Revitalization Act

By 1997, Congress believed the District's financial house had still not come to
order. It demanded that additional responsibilities be transferred from the Mayor
27 U.S. Congressional Research Service, District of Columbia Revitalization: The President's
Plan for the Court System, (97-653; June 19, 1997) [hereafter CRS Report 97-653].
28 Id.
29 The District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 1995,
Pub. L. 104-8, 109 Stat. 97.
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and the Council to the Financial Control Board. To accomplish this shift, Congress passed the 1997 Revitalization Act, 30 which also terminated the federal payment to the District. In lieu of a payment, financial support was provided to the
District-the federal government assumed previously locally supported functions. Because the elimination of the federal payment represented a loss of approximately $600 million in District revenue, the 1997 Revitalization Act shifted
about an equal value of District functions to the federal government. To round
out and develop an offset to the revenue reduction caused by the terminated
federal payment, the District's obligations for its court system were also assumed
by the federal government, as were the budget burdens of certain other agencies. 3 Pension liabilities and other benefits affecting court personnel were also
assumed by the federal government.
Although the transition from local to federal control provided a source of
greater financial security to the District, the change was accompanied by many
personnel problems as long-time court employees found their pensions and other
benefits sharply reduced as a result of the change. Thus, the transition in the
funding source was not easy.
D.

The 1997 Memorandum of Understanding

In anticipation of the passage of the 1997 Revitalization Act, negotiations were
undertaken between the Mayor, the D.C. Council, and the White House concerning a variety of changes affecting the administration of justice, including but not
limited to arrangements for funding the D.C. court system. 32 A memorandum of
understanding between the D.C. Council and the White House approved a shift
of responsibility for funding the D.C. courts to the federal government. As had
been the practice since 1970, the 1997 Revitalization Act maintained the practice
of having a unified courts budget prepared by the Joint Committee and submitted
to the Mayor and the D.C. Council for review but not alteration. However, since
1997, the budget has been submitted directly to the OMB for transmission to
Congress, not as a part of the D.C. budget, but as the budget of a separate governmental entity. Congress, of course, remains free to modify the budget as it
desires. Once approved, the budget is funded directly by Congress to a special
account in the U.S. Treasury established for this purpose. 33 Through this technique, the budgets of various agencies, including those of the D.C. courts, the
Pretrial Services Agency, and the Public Defender Service were transferred to
30 Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251.
31 Including the District of Columbia Public Defender Service and the Pretrial Services Agency
and Defender Services.
32 CRS Report 97-653 at 7-8.
33 Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat 251. Initial proposals contemplated
that the D.C. Court budget would be administered by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts in
the federal judiciary, but this supervisory control was abandoned in the final approach. Id.
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federal control, so that salary, benefits, and other administrative burdens relating
to the operation of the local courts are provided under the aegis of the federal
government, rather than that of the D.C. government. Significantly, by the 1997
Revitalization Act, the federal government also assumed the burden of the unfunded pension liabilities for the District, estimated at that time to exceed $4.8
billion, a portion of which applied to District judges and non-judicial court personnel. With the resources of the federal government, however, comes the potential and occasional reality of interference with local judicial matters- powerful
members of Congress have been known to intervene in local cases and have exerted pressure on the budget process when a member has disapproved the outcome of a decision in a particular matter.
HI.

MAGNITUDE OF THE

D.C.

COURTS' BUDGET

The D.C. courts are complex and substantial; consequently, the budget for
their operations, including items that do not appear directly in the operational
budget, are very considerable. In fiscal year 2006, the courts' budget request for
operations, including components for the D.C. Court of Appeals, the Superior
Court, and the court system was for $149.8 million. Congress appropriated $138.1
million. In addition, the Courts requested $54 million for capital improvements
and received $44 million. 34 These figures do not take into account a separate
budget submittal for defense services. 35 For fiscal year 2006, an additional $44
million was appropriated for those purposes. Nor do they take into consideration
the value of benefits paid to court personnel or the funding of pension obligations
relating to them.
The capital budget for the courts represeits a significant burden over and
above the operational budget. One component is the renovation of the old courthouse. 36 That undertaking will cost in excess of $100 million. Beyond that, expansion of the Moultrie Courthouse to enable completion of the Family Court and
modernization of the building, now more than thirty-years-old, will require another $30 million. The total capital budget is projected by the Joint Committee at
$180 million and is now in mid-stream.37
34 The courts have embarked on a major capital improvement project, including the renovation
of the old courthouse at 451 Indiana Avenue, NW. These improvements include an addition to and an
upgrading of the Moultrie Courthouse to accommodate the Family Court function and a modernization of "Building C." These expenditures are budgeted at nearly $180 million in the Fiscal Year 2008
budget request of the Joint Committee.
35 Defense services include payment for court-appointed counsel for persons charged with
crimes or for persons involved in child abuse, neglect, and guardianship disputes.
36 The old courthouse was located at 451 Indiana Avenue, N.W., across from the Moultrie
Courthouse.
37 See Fiscal Year Budget Request of the Joint Committee, available at http://www.dccourts.
gov/reports (last visited Dec. 4, 2007).
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SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT BUDGETING PROCESS

Both the operational and capital cost of the D.C. Court system are no longer
an obligation of the D.C. Government. The budgeting process operates entirely
38
independently of the budget process for most of the District's other functions.
While the Mayor and the D.C. Council are provided with a copy of the budget
request when it is submitted to the Office of Management and Budget for ultimate presentation to Congress, they may comment on the budget but may not
alter the submission. Congress, of course, makes the final decision on how much
of the requested budget will be funded and may take into consideration comments provided by the Mayor and/or the Council.
V.

ANALYSIS AND THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE

The District's unique budget process provides the courts with many benefits
that would not be available to it if a traditional state funding model were utilized.
At the same time, the separation of that process from the budgeting process relating to executive agencies constrains the Mayor and the Council in their fiscal
options by putting beyond the reach of the budget axe the substantial sum paid to
or for the benefit of the courts. Moreover, the continuing role of Congress in
providing the wherewithal for the courts also means that Congress has the capacity, sometimes exercised, to intervene directly in District judicial affairs.
Under the current plan, the compensation of judges is tied automatically to
that provided to federal district and appellate judges, which undoubtedly enhances the ability to attract well qualified candidates and to retain experienced
members of the bench. The stability provided by federal assumption of operations, capital, benefit, and pension obligations relating to the court provides an
additional recruiting and retention advantage. Given the impediments to financial self-sufficiency for the District manifested by the prohibition of a commuter
tax and the inability to tax federal or diplomatic real estate, which comprise much
of the District's valuable land, it is apparent that the provision of federal financial
support for the courts is an indispensable method of curing what would otherwise
be an intolerable budget burden. In short, federal assumption of these obligations, whatever the undesired effect of federal control, relieves the District, and
its taxpayers, not only of the routine and heavy burden of normal judicial functions but also of the extraordinary capital expense which a dynamic judicial machine is likely to encounter.
38 Recently, legislation has been introduced in Congress to relax or eliminate Congressional
control over the District's expenditure of its local funds. H.R. 733, 110th Cong, (lst Sess. 2007). If
passed, this legislation could significantly alter the method for approval and expenditure of District
funds. It would not, however, affect the process for approving or spending federal funds approved for
the District, whether relating to "entitlement" programs or local functions taken on by the federal
government, such as the Court's budget.
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The courts' budget, while not sacrosanct, is largely insulated from the political
push and pull that affects other components of the government, thereby assuring
a high degree of independence to the judiciary. Although Congress has been
known to act upon the District's judicial decisions with a heavy hand when, for
example, a member of a Senator's staff receives an unhappy outcome to a case, or
on Congress is translated into a peculiar action limitwhere the political pressure
39
ing local jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, transferring the very considerable financial burden to the shoulders of the District without locating a matching revenue source would be hard to
imagine, even if the assumption of full control of the judiciary by the District's
residents were a uniformly accepted goal. Because several justice-related agencies 4° must function in harmony and in balance, a change in the funding of one
would have to call into question the funding of the others. Even a partial transfer
of funding, if one could be developed, would require either a significant capital
infusion or a marked reduction in services, compensation, or both. Anything that
would alter the financial stability provided to the court system would likely have
deleterious effects for the selection and retention of judges and of other important courthouse personnel. Moreover, the provision of defense services by private
counsel and the supervisory pretrial release services provided by the Pretrial Services agency would also likely suffer. Given the importance of judicial independence, the high quality of the current judiciary, and the stability provided by the
present financing system, it is difficult to imagine how any changes in the budget
process could benefit the District or its citizens absent a change in the restrictions
on the District's taxing authority. However, if increased financial control were
ceded to the District by elimination of the restriction on commuter taxation, for
example, the issue of budgeting would have to come back under the microscope.
For with the ability to pay all its own bills, which such new taxing authority would
provide, the District might well wish to revisit the options for control and funding
of its courts. That day does not seem near at hand, but if the political winds
change and the District's taxing authority are increased, the budgeting process
would deserve a fresh look.

39 For example, in 1989, Congress passed the D.C. Civil Contempt Imprisonment Limitation
Act and later the Elizabeth Morgan Act, both aimed at over-ruling a politically charged custody case.
See D.C. Civil Contempt Imprisonment Limitation Act, Pub. L. 101-97, 103 Stat. 633; Elizabeth Morgan Act, D.C. CODE § 11-925 (2001). The latter was held to be an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder,
but this escapade still demonstrates that when it comes to the District of Columbia nothing, and
certainly not the courts and their jurisdiction, is beyond the power of Congress. Foretich, et al. v. U.S.,
351 F.3d 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
40 Agencies such as the U.S. Attorney's Office, the Public Defenders Service, and the courts
themselves.

